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COMMONWEALTH v. JAMES: DENIAL OF
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION TO THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A
PRELIMINARY HEARING
I. INTRODUCTION
When Isaac James was fifteen years old he was arrested in con-
nection with the fatal stabbing of Harold Holmes. The incident oc-
curred after dissension had arisen between the two during a basket-
ball game at a public schoolyard. 1 A judge of the Juvenile Court
Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia certified the case
to the district attorney for prosecution. 2 James was not repre-
sented by counsel at the certification hearing.3 On June 1, 1954,
James, with counsel present, entered a general plea of guilty to mur-
der in the then Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail De-
livery of Philadelphia County. A three-judge court accepted the
plea, conducted an evidentiary hearing, found him guilty of murder
in the first degree, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. He did
not appeal the judgment. In 1968, James began post conviction re-
lief proceedings.4 Relief was denied by the court which originally
heard the case, and this appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania followed.
In his appeal James argued a violation of due process on four
grounds. Three of his contentions were dismissed by the court be-
cause they had not been raised in the court below.5 The first allega-
tion, that the absence of counsel at the certification hearing violated
due process, was considered by the court.
1. Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 207, 269 A.2d 898, 899 (1970).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 260 (1965), states that when a child above
fourteen years of age is held for any offense, other than murder, which is
punishable by imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the juvenile court
judge may certify the case to the district attorney for prosecution as if ju-
venile court jurisdiction had never attached if, in the judge's opinion,
"the interests of the State require a prosecution of such case on an indict-
ment."
Gaskins Case, 430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 622 (1968), held that the statute also
applied in murder cases because the juvenile court could not wrest the
court of common pleas of its jurisdiction over murder cases. Thus, certifi-
cation is mandatory for murder.
3. It should also be noted that no record of the certification hearing
was available when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Com-
monwealth v. James.
4. Under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-81 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
5. Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 208-09, 269 A.2d 898, 899
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that there was, in
fact, a violation of due process, determining that Coleman v. Ala-
bama6 which required the presence of counsel at a preliminary hear-
ing, was applicable. However, the court refused to apply Coleman
retroactively.7 The court reasoned that since the certification hear-
ing only concerned a waiver of jurisdiction, absence of counsel at
this hearing did not affect the truth or accuracy of the "subsequent
guilt-determining process .. ."I The court refused to equate this
case with those in which counsel was denied at trial or during pro-
ceedings determining guilt. It relied on the statement in Coleman
that if the absence of counsel at a preliminary hearing did not lead
to prejudice, then such absence would constitute harmless error.9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that denial of counsel at
trial could never constitute harmless error.10
The court also decided that James' guilty plea was made volun-
tarily, that there was no error in the acceptance of the plea, and that
there was no denial of the effective assistance of trial counsel.1 '
Mr. Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion.12  He argued
that even though under Alabama law the defendant does not have to
plead or advance defenses at a preliminary hearing, the United
States Supreme Court in Coleman still found this hearing to be a
"critical stage" in the prosecution. In his opinion there is "a sub-
stantial potential for prejudice flowing from the absence of coun-
(1970). The three allegations not considered by the Court were:
(2) unavailability of a transcript of the proceeding; (3) the hear-
ing court abused its discretion in certifying the case; (4) the ruling
in Gaskins . . . violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in that there is no reasonable basis for treat-
ing juveniles accused of murder differently than those accused of
less serious crimes.
6. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). See generally Note, Constitutional Right to
Counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, 75 DICK. L. REV. 143 (1970).
7. The distinction must be drawn between true retroactivity and par-
tial retroactivity. In most cases, the decision is applied to the party before
the court when the rule is announced. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
627 (1965). Thus, the decision is given partial retroactive effect. The ques-
tion then becomes whether to apply it to all other cases decided before the
rule was announced or just to limit its retroactive effect to the parties be-
fore the court. Thus, Coleman received the benefit of the right to counsel
determination even though his preliminary hearing was held prior to the
United States Supreme Court's decision. The question now is whether the
Coleman rule should be applied retroactivily to other cases, such as James.
The unfairness of applying the rule retroactively to the party before
the court when the rule is announced and to no one else is the subject of
most of Justice Black's dissents in cases denying retroactivity, e.g., Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 641 (1965).
8. 440 Pa. 205, 209, 269 A.2d 898, 900 (1970).
9. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, (1970):
The test to be applied is whether the denial of counsel at the pre-
liminary hearing was harmless error under Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18....
Id.
10. Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 210, 269 A.2d 898, 900 (1970).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 210, 269 A.2d at 900 (dissenting opinion).
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sel."'1  Justice Roberts quoted from Coleman regarding the preju-
dice which could result from the absence of counsel at a preliminary
hearing.'
4
Since James was certified over for prosecution, Justice Roberts
argued that a prima facie case of murder must have been estab-
lished against him. This meant that incriminating evidence must
have been raised at the certification hearing. Therefore, he stated,
Coleman was applicable. But this is not a departure from the ma-
jority opinion; it too found Coleman applicable. However, Justice
Roberts argued that Coleman should be retroactive. He cited deci-
sions in which the United States Supreme Court made the right to
counsel in other situations retroactive.'5  He also referred to the
decisions leading to Coleman which were applied retroactively by
the United States Supreme Court.16 He would have remanded the
case for a determination of whether there was harmless error or
whether the absence of counsel at the certification hearing rendered
James's guilty plea involuntary or unintelligent.
17
In Commonwealth v. Thomas,'8 decided the same day as James,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again denied retroactive applica-
tion of Coleman, citing James as controlling. Mr. Justice Roberts
again dissented.
13. Id. at 211, 269 A.2d at 901 (dissenting opinion).
14. Id. Coleman v. Alabama set out the following four areas of po-
tential prejudice:
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination
of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case, that
may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Sec-
ond, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an ex-
perienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in
cross-examination of a State's witnesses at the trial or preserve
testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not ap-
pear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively dis-
cover the case the State has against his client and make possible
the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial.
Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing
in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as
the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail.
399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
15. The cases cited are: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
held retroactive in Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), held retroactive in Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S.
584 (1964); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), held retroactive in Mc-
Connell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)
and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), held retroactive in Arsenault
v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968).
16. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) and White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963), held retroactive in Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S.
5 (1968).
17. Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205 at 213, 269 A.2d 898 at 901-2
(1970).
18. 440 Pa. 213, 270 A.2d 211 (1970).
At common law all decisions were applied retroactively.' 9 How
ever, the modern doctrine is that courts can refuse retroactive appli-
cation to a decision.20 As the United States Supreme Court stated in
Linkletter v. Walker: "[w] e believe that the Constitution neither
prohibits nor requires retrospective effect."' 21 Recently a number of
United States Supreme Court cases have considered the retroac-
tivity issue. 22 It is in light of the standards established in these
cases that Commonwealth v. James must be considered.
23
At the outset some words of caution are necessary. First, a dis-
tinction existed between cases heard on habeas corpus and those on
direct review. Previously, if the court ruled against retroactivity,
the new rule was still applied to cases arising on direct review.
2 4
However, this is no longer the case; a court can now refuse to make
a decision retroactive even to cases on direct review.25 But the dis-
tinction should be borne in mind when considering the retroactivity
cases.
26
19. E.g., Norton v. Shelbey County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) where the
Court expressed the rationale as:
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it im-
poses no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.
Id. at 442. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (dissenting
opinion HOLMES, J.) states:
I know of no authority in this court to say that in general state
decisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial decisions
have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.
Id. at 372.
20. E.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287
U.S. 358 (1932) (holding that prospective overruling was not unconstitu-
tional). Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) states: "[T]he accepted
rule today is that in appropriate cases the Court may in the interest of jus-
tice make the rule prospective." Id. at 628. For an excellent historical
development of the concepts of retroactivity and prospectivity see Prospec-
tive Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 907 (1962).
21. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
22. E.g., Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1968); Fuller
v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968);
McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631
(1968); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. Shott, 382
U.S. 406 (1965); Mordecai v. United States, 421 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970); Kemplen v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 8 (D.
Md. 1969).
23. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v.
Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254 A.2d 923 (1969):
[W]e must make our own determination based on the standards
set forth in prior [U.S.] Supreme Court decisions dealing with the
retrospective versus prospective application of decisions in the
criminal area.
Id. at 534, 254 A.2d at 924.
24. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965).
25. E.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
26. 74 DIcK. L. REv. 556 (1970).
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
II. TESTS TO DETERMINE RETROACTIVITY
In 1965 the United States Supreme Court decided Linkletter v.
Walker,27 denying the retroactive application of Mapp v. Ohio.28
The Court set out the test to be applied in determining whether a
new ruling should be given retroactive effect. The test consisted
of three considerations: (a) the purpose of the new rule or standard,
(b) the extent to which the old rule or standard was relied upon by
law enforcement authorities, and (c) the effect which retroactivity
would have upon the administration of justice.29 This test has been
reiterated and applied in the cases which have followed Linkletter.
3 0
A. Purpose Of The New Rule Or Standard
The first consideration in determining whether a decision should
be applied retroactively is the purpose of the new rule or standard:
Will the purpose of the new rule be effected by retroactive opera-
tion.31 Very closely related and probably the most important con-
sideration in determining whether a decision should be applied ret-
roactively is whether the new rule affects the integrity and fairness
of the fact-finding process.3 2 Although there is some evidence that
the strict application of this standard has eroded somewhat in the
past few years,33 it remains the most important factor which the
court weighs in deciding for or against retroactivity 4 A review
of the leading cases in this field will illustrate the Supreme Court's
application of the "purpose" and "integrity of the fact-finding proc-
ess" tests. Since these tests are the most important, this Note will
emphasize the developments in this area.
Prior to Linkletter, the Court had generally applied new Consti-
tutional rules to decided cases without discussing retroativity.3 5 In
Linkletter the Court was faced with the issue of whether to apply
Mapp v. Ohio retroactively, holding illegally seized evidence inad-
27. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
30. See cases cited note 22 supra.
31. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
32. Id. at 639.
33. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257 (1969) (dissenting
opinion of DOUGLAS, J.).
34. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969); Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295
(1968).
35. E.g., Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S.
202 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); McNerlin v. Denno, 378
U.S. 575 (1964); Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964).
missible in state criminal trials.88 The Court found that the purpose
of the rule announced in Mapp was to deter "lawless action of the
police and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amendment. '37 This
purpose, the Court decided, would not be advanced by applying the
rule retroactively. The improper police activity had already oc-
curred and could not be corrected by releasing the victims.3 8 Nor
could the privacy of the victims' homes, which had already been vio-
lated, be restored by making Mapp retroactive. 39 Furthermore, the
purpose of Mapp was to protect against such intrusions and did not
go to the integrity of the fact-finding process. 40 The relevancy and
reliability of the seized evidence was not questioned.
41
Tehan v. Shott 42 was concerned with the retroactive application
of Griffin v. California,43 which held that adverse comment cannot
be made upon a defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial.
The Court found that there was no single purpose attributable to
Griffin.44 Rather, the purpose "is to be found in the whole complex
of values that the privilege against self-incrimination itself repre-
sents. . ... "45 The basic purpose of the fifth amendment was not to
protect the innocent from conviction but to maintain the integrity of
our judicial system which requires the prosecution to "shoulder the
entire load" in achieving a conviction. 4" The Court stated that the
purposes of the fifth amendment also related to the inviolability of
the human personality and the privacy of an individual's enclave.
47
Once any intrusion upon these rights occurred, it could not be reme-
died by retroactive application of the rule.48 A further purpose of
Griffin was to discourage courts from penalizing a person for exer-
cising his fifth amendment privilege.49 The court decided this would
not be advanced by retroactivity. Furthermore, the rule announced
did not, in the Court's opinion, affect the integrity of the fact-find-
ing process.50 They said that the privilege against self-incrimination
was not "an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth"51 but rather
36. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court in Linkletter was only concerned
with judgments which had become final before Mapp. The Court explained
what it meant by final:
By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered,
the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for
certiorari had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
37. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 639.
41. Id.
42. 382 U.S. 406 (1965).
43. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
44. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1965).
45. Id. at 414.
46. Id. at 415.
47. Id. at 416.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 414.




embodied values "reflecting the concern of our society for the right
of each individual to be let alone.
52
Tehan indicates an erosion of the "integrity of the fact-finding
process" test. At least one aspect of the Griffin standard could very
well affect the ultimate determinations of fact. One of the pur-
poses of the rule against adverse comment is to discourage courts
from penalizing the defendant for exercising his fifth amendment
privilege. The penalty exacted for such exercise prior to Griffin
may have been an improper determination of fact by the jury on the
basis of erroneous implications raised by the adverse comment.
Johnson v. New Jersey53 denied retroactive application to the
decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois54 and Miranda v. Arizona.55 The
Court found the purpose of the decisions to be to "guarantee full
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination." 56 The Court
explicitly chiseled at the strict interpretation of the "integrity of the
fact-finding process" test as applied to the purpose of the new rule.
"[W] e emphasize that the question whether a constitutional rule of
criminal procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of the
fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of degree." 57
The Court stated that they had denied retroactive application in
Tehan even though the jury might sometimes be misled by the ad-
verse comment."' The Court determined that jury error was a ques-
tion of probability and that there were other factors which had to be
weighed. Among the other factors is "the extent to which other
safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truth-deter-
mining process at trial."59 The application of this additional factor
can be discerned in many of the cases which follow Johnson. ° In
Johnson the Court determined that the alternative of attacking the
voluntariness of the confession was a viable substitute for retroac-
tive application of Escobedo and Miranda.6' Two further points
were made in Johnson which are of utmost importance. First, it is
clear that retroactive application of a decision does not depend upon
52. Id.
53. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
54. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
57. Id. at 728-29.
58. Id. at 729.
59. Id.
60. Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969); Mordecai v. United
States, 421 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970).
Pennsylvania also followed this view, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willman, 434
Pa. 489, 255 A.2d 534 (1969); Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254
A.2d 923 (1969).
61. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966).
the provision of the Constitution involved 62 or upon the value of the
guarantee. 6 Although in most instances sixth amendment rights
have been declared retroactive, this does not require that all sixth
amendment rights be applied retroactively. Second, no matter how
important the Constitutional guarantee may be, if the rule does not
affect the "integrity of the fact-finding process" it will not be given
retroactive effect.
6 4
De Stafano v. Woods6 5 decided against retroactive application
of Duncan v. Louisiana6 6 and Bloom v. Illinois,67 which held that the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Court
found the purpose of this rule to be the prevention of repression and
arbitrary conduct.6 8 However, the Court, applying the "question of
probabilities" standard set up in Johnson, decided that retroactive
application would not serve the values of the sixth amendment
right involved in the case, since not every trial without a jury is
unfair.6 9
Desist v. United States70 refused retroactive application to Katz
v. United States,7 ' which held that electronic eavesdropping is a
search or seizure and can only comply with constitutional standards
if made pursuant to a warrant authorized by a neutral magistrate
upon demonstration of probable cause and carried out under "pre-
cise limitations and appropriate safeguards. '72 The Court analogized
to Linkletter and the purpose of the rule denouncing illegal searches
and seizures. While not explicitly stated, it seems they believed the
purpose was the same as in Linkletter-the protection of individual
privacy.7 3 The Court stated that the purpose criterion "strongly
supports prospectivity for a decision amplifying the evidentiary ex-
clusionary rule. '74 Further, the Court viewed the exclusion of evi-
dence as a procedural weapon which did not attack the fairness of
the trial.75  There was no likelihood that the evidence seized was
not reliable. 76 The Court noted support for its interpretation of the
"purpose" and "integrity" standard in Johnson v. New Jersey,17
Stovall v. Denno,78 and Tehan v. Shott.79
62. Id. at 728.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
66. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
67. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
68. De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968).
69. Id. at 633-34.
70. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
71. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 246 (1969).
73. Id. at 249-50.
74. Id. at 249.
75. Id. at 250.
76. Id.
77. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
78. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
79. 382 U.S. 406 (1965).
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B. Reliance By Law Enforcement Authorities On The Old Standard
The second consideration which must be weighed in determin-
ing whether to apply a new standard retroactively is the reliance
upon the old standard by law enforcement officials. In Linkletter
this standard was considered and found to favor prospective appli-
cation. s0 In 1949 the United States Supreme Court held in Wolf v.
Colorado"' that the search and seizure aspect of the fourth amend-
ment applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
However, the Court also decided that the exclusionary rule8 2 was
not within the command of the fourth amendment.8 3 rt was this
portion of the decision which was overturned by Mapp. One reason
given in Linkletter for refusing to apply Mapp, retroactively was the
reliance by the authorities on the Wolf decision.
8 4
The Court has continued in case after case to apply the reliance
test. 5 If the Court's decision on a particular issue was foreshad-
owed by other cases, then the reliance test favors retroactivity. 6
However, if the new standard represents a clear break with the
past, the reliance standard favors prospective application.
7
Desist v. United States88 is an illuminating case in this area.
As discussed above, it concerned the retroactive application of Katz
v. United States,8 9 which held that electronic eavesdropping is a
search or seizure. The decision in Katz seems to have been clearly
foreshadowed. The Court discussed whether retroactivity even had
to be considered. Desist had argued that the question of retroac-
tivity did not have to be considered because Katz did not represent
a change in the law.90 The Court stated:
Our holding there [Katz] that Goldman and Olmstead "can
no longer be regarded as controlling", 389 U. S., at 353, rec-
ognized that those decisions had not been overruled until
that day. True, the principles they expressed had been
modified. The belief that an oral conversation could not be
the object of a "search" or "seizure" had not survived. And
in Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, we had cau-
tioned that the scope of the Fourth Amendment could not
80. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
81. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
82. The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure in federal prosecution. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
83. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949).
84. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
85. See cases cited note 22 supra.
86. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966).
87. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
88. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
89. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
90. 394 U.S. 244, 247 (1969).
be ascertained by resort to the "niceties of tort or real prop-
erty law." 365 U. S., at 511. But the assumption persisted
that electronic surveillance did not offend the Constitution
unless there was an "actual intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area." While decisions before Katz may have re-
flected growing dissatisfaction with the traditional tests of
the constitutional validity of electronic surveillance, the
Court consistently reiterated those tests and declined in-
vitations to abandon them. However clearly our holding
in Katz may have been foreshadowed, it was a clear break
with the past, and we are thus compelled to decide whether
its application should be limited to the future.91
The Court went on to decide the reliance test against retroactivity
saying that they had consistently reiterated the former eavesdrop-
ping tests and had refused to abandon them.9 2 Justice Douglas, in
dissent, expressed the view that the reliance factor was being bent
in order to achieve prospectivity.13 Regardless, it would logically
seem that the reliance factor will generally be decided in favor of
prospective application.
C. Effect Of The New Standard Upon The Administration of
Justice
The final factor which the Court weighs in determining whether
to grant retroactive application to a decision is the effect retroactive
application will have upon the administration of justice.9 4 The most
obvious factor to be considered is the number of cases which will
have to be reconsidered.9 5 Among other factors which must be
weighed are the availability of witnesses and evidence.9 5  As the
Court said in Linkletter:
Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of evi-
dence long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If
it is excluded, the witnesses available at the time of the
original trial will not be available or if located their mem-
ory will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an extraor-
dinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt
would seriously disrupt the administration of justice.9 7
91. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1969) (footnotes
omitted).
92. Id. at 250-51.
93. Id. at 257 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Fortas also dissented
saying:
But there is no justification for refusing "retroactive" application
to a constitutional principle merely because an earlier reading of
the Constitution that had been widely repudiated as unsound and
that this Court's own intervening opinions had discredited, al-
though not expressly overruled. Olmstead is in this category.
Katz did no more than administer the coup de grace to its mor-
ibund doctrine.
Id. at 273.
94. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
95. Mordecai v. United States, 421 F.2d 1133, 1137-38 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970).
96. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
97. Id. at 637-38.
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Tehan v. Shot 9 s is an interesting case in its application of this
standard. Only six states had not adopted the rule forbidding com-
ment on a defendant's failure to testify prior to the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Griffin v. California.9 9 Yet the Court found
that the effect on the administration of justice favored prospectivity.
Although only six states had not adopted the rule, the Court rea-
soned the effect on the administration of justice in those states
would be great.' 0°
As stated above, the "purpose test" and "integrity of the fact-
finding process test" are the most important; and the two factors
just discussed must always be considered in light of them.1 1
III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL CASES
Most of the cases concerning the denial of counsel have been
applied retroactively because such representation was deemed essen-
tial to the fairness of the fact-finding process.10 2 Decisions guaran-
teeing the right to counsel at arraignment, 1 3 at trial,' on ap-
peal, 0 5 at sentencing,'0 and the exclusion of evidence obtained at a
preliminary hearing in the absence of counsel0 7 have all been ap-
plied retroactively. However, decisions declaring a right to counsel
at interrogations 0 8 and line-ups 0 9 have not been given retroactive
effect.
Doughty v. Maxwell"" retroactively applied Gideon v. Wain-
wright,"' which held that the denial of counsel at trial was violative
of the Constitution. Smith v. Crouse"1' applied Douglas v. Cali,
fornia retroactively,11 '  insuring the right to counsel on appeal. Both
Doughty and Smith were memorandum decisions rendered before
Linkletter began the line of cases fully discussing the retroactivity
question. However, both logically fit in with the Court's later deci-
sions allowing retroactivity when the absence of counsel affects
98. 382 U.S. 406 (1965).
99. Id. at 418.
100. Id.
101. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
102. See Mordecai v. United States, 421 F.2d 1133, 1135
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970).
103. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
104. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
105. Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964).
106. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
107. Aresenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968).
108. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
109. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
110. 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
111. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
112. 378 U.S. 584 (1964).
113. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
(D.C. Cir. 1969),
"the integrity of the guilt-determining process." Such effect is
highly probable when the right to counsel is denied during trial or
on appeal.
Stovall v. Denno"1 4 denied retroactive effect to the right to
counsel at an identification hearing. As discussed above, by 1967
the Court had begun to erode the "integrity of the fact-finding proc-
ess" test and had begun to weigh the probabilities of adverse effect
upon the "integrity of the fact-finding process." 115 The Court
stated:
[U] nlike cases in which counsel is absent at trial or on ap-
peal, it may confidently be assumed that confrontations for
identification can be and often have been conducted in the
absence of counsel with scrupulous fairness and without
prejudice to the accused at trial.
1 16
Also, as discussed above, the Court takes account of the availability
of alternative remedies for those who could benefit by retroactive
application of a decision. The alternative available in Stovall was
the ability of all persons to allege and prove that there was such
unfairness at the confrontation that "it infringed his right to due
process of law."11 7 The Court also found that the factors of the reli-
ance test and the effect upon the administration justice argued
against retroactivity. 1 8
Arsenault v. Massachusetts"9 concerned the retroactive applica-
tion of White v. Maryland,120 which established the right to counsel
in certain preliminary proceedings where the rights of the accused
might be adversely affected. In making the decision retroactive the
Court referred to other cases involving the right to counsel which
had been held retroactive and further quoted Stovall stating that
"the denial of the right must almost invariably deny a fair trial.'
2'
McConnell v. Rhay122 retroactively applied Mempa v. Rhay,"'
requiring counsel for felony defendants in revocation of probation
and imposition of deferred sentencing proceedings. The Court again
referred to other cases where the right to counsel had been held
retroactive and asserted that the right in Mempa related to the in-
tegrity of the fact-finding process.1 4 In McConnell the Court
looked beyond the integrity of the fact-finding process at trial
(logically the absence of counsel at sentencing could not affect the
integrity of the fact-finding process at trial) and considered the ef-
114. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
115. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
116. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1967).
117. Id. at 299.
118. Id. at 299-300.
119. 393 U.S. 5 (1968).
120. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
121. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968); quoting Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
122. 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
123. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
124. McConnell v. Rhay, 396 U.S. 2, 3 (1968).
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fect of the lack of counsel on the particular proceeding itself:
As we said in Mempa, "the necessity for the aid of counsel
in marshalling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating
circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the de-
fendant to present his case as to sentence is apparent.""'12
Johnson v. New Jersey12' refused to apply the rules in Esco-
bedo127 and Miranda128 retroactively. It said their purpose was to
protect a person against self-incrimination. 129 It established the
"question of probabilities" standard mentioned above and in decid-
ing this question took into account other safeguards available to
protect the "integrity of the fact-finding process. '13 0 The Court de-
termined that the substantial test of voluntariness was available and
furthermore, "[t] hat test now takes specific account of the failure to
advise the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination or to
allow him access to outside assistance.'' 131 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that although Miranda and Escobedo provided safeguards
against unreliable statements at trial, there were means other than
retroactivity to protect the fact-finding process.132
IV. COLEMAN V. ALABAMA APPLIED TO PENNSYLVANIA
JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
Commonwealth v. James refused to apply Coleman v. Alabama
retroactively. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to
mention the tests established by the United States Supreme Court,
the language of the majority opinion clearly shows that it was ap-
plying these tests and also shows an awareness of the trend in this
field. 13 ' The court concluded that the certification hearing con-
cerned a waiver of jurisdiction and was not in itself a determina-
tion of delinquency." 4 The court then considered the "integrity of
125. Id. at 4.
126. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
127. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
128. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
129. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 730.
132. Id.
133. This can be seen in the court's statements referring to the truth
and accuracy of the guilt-determining process. It can also be seen in its ref-
erence to other right to counsel cases declared retroactive by the United
States Supreme Court (in attempting to distinguish James from them).
Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 209-10, 269 A.2d 898, 900 (1970). It
is this writer's opinion that the court did not consider either the reliance or
the effect upon the administration of justice tests because these are impor-
tant only if the purpose test does not clearly favor prospectivity or retro-
activity.
134. For a juvenile's rights in such a proceeding see In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967).
the fact-finding process" test, concluding "[t] he fundamental fair-
ness, truth and accuracy of the subsequent guilt-determining proc-
ess was not affected by the lack of counsel at this hearing."
1 5
However, the lack of counsel at the hearing could affect the fair-
ness of the fact-finding process at trial. Since the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court found the decision in Coleman applicable to the certi-
fication hearing, the four reasons advanced in Coleman for the ne-
cessity of counsel at a preliminary hearing must be considered. The
second and third rationales for the Coleman decision seem to af-
fect the integrity of the fact-finding process at trial.
Second. . . the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an ex-
perienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for
use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial,
or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness
who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel
can more effectively discover the case the state has against
his client and make possible the preparation of a proper de-
fense to meet that case at the trial. 136
Impeachment tools, preservation of favorable testimony, proper
preparation of a defense all affect the fairness and integrity of the
fact-finding process at trial.
However, several observations must be made. First, a juvenile
against whom a prima facie case of murder has been established
must be certified to the district attorney for prosecution. The
juvenile court judge sits as a committing magistrate.18 7 When the
juvenile is transferred into the adult criminal process it is common
practice to allow the juvenile a preliminary hearing. The adverse
affect upon the integrity of the fact-finding process at trial, men-
tioned above, will not occur if counsel is present at this preliminary
hearing. Thus, although the certification hearing did not insure
the defendant of the necessary pretrial safeguards, the preliminary
hearing might. Pennsylvania procedure has allowed a defendant
accused of murder the right to appointed counsel at a preliminary
hearing since 1965.138 This was declared a constitutional right by
Coleman in 1970.189 Since a juvenile certified for murder in Penn-
sylvania can receive a preliminary hearing and has a right to ap-
pointed counsel at this hearing, the adverse affects mentioned
above which could flow from the absence of counsel at the certifica-
tion hearing do not apply.
For offenses other than murder the certification process is some-
what different. Common practice is to attempt to settle the matter
informally. If this fails, an adjudicatory hearing is held. At this
hearing the judge decides whether or not to certify the case for
adult criminal prosecution. If certification is decided on, the juve-
135. Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 209, 269 A.2d 898, 900 (1970).
136. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
137. Gaskins Case, 430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 662 (1968).
138. Pa. R. Crim. P. 119 (d) now Pa. R. Crim. P. 120 (d).
139. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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nile generally enters the adult criminal process at the grand jury
level. Thus the opportunity for a preliminary hearing is lost. But
common practice is to allow the juvenile all the rights declared by
Kent v. United States'40 at his adjudicatory hearing, including the
right to counsel. Thus, since 1966 (the date of the Kent decision) a
juvenile has been given the right under Pennsylvania practice to
counsel at the adjudicatory hearing where the certification decision
is made. The adverse affects stated in Coleman which could flow
from the lack of counsel are mitigated by Pennsylvania practice.
That practice forms the basis for a strong argument opposing retro-
activity, since the probability of prejudice is slight.
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to
consider the possibility that the integrity of the certification hear-
ing itself might have been affected by the lack of counsel. The
United States Supreme Court recognized the possibility of such
prejudice in McConnell v. Rhay,14' declaring retroactive the decision
in Mempa v. Rhay, 42 requiring counsel for felony defendants in rev-
ocation of probation and imposition of deferred sentencing proceed-
ings. As the United States Court of Appeals stated in Mordecai v.
United States:
These stages [preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial, ap-
peal] all hold implications for the "integrity of the fact-
finding process" that determines guilt or innocence. A
waiver of jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court does not do
this, but rather simply sets in motion the terrible wheels of
an adult proceeding. But the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the "integrity of the fact-finding" process is criti-
cally important at other stages of the criminal process than
those determining guilt. McConnell v. Rhay declared ret-
roactive the decision in Mempa v. Rhay requiring counsel at
a sentencing hearing. The waiver hearing certainly calls
as loudly for the "guiding hand" of counsel as does the sen-
tencing hearing; indeed, the investigations relevant for each
are not entirely dissimilar in scope and subject matter.143
The court of appeals in Mordecai was concerned with the retroac-
140. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
141. 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
142. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
143. Mordecai v. United States, 421 F.2d 1133, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It
should also be noted that two of the reasons advanced in Coleman for the
necessity of counsel at a preliminary hearing affect the integrity of the
proceeding itself:
First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination
of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case, that
may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over.
... Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary
hearing in making arguments for the accused on such matters as
the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail.
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
tive application of Kent v. United States,1 4 4 requiring counsel at ju-
venile certification hearings in the District of Columbia. The court
of appeals decided against retroactive application on the grounds
of reliance and the effect upon the administration of justice,1 45 hav-
ing found that the purpose test did argue for retroactivity. 14 How-
ever, the court in Mordecai made its decision in light of the District
of Columbia certification statute which requires a full investiga-
tion before the juvenile court can certify the case.147 Much of the
court's opinion in deciding that the purpose argued for retroactivity
related to the necessity of counsel to the required full investiga-
tion.148  Although Mordecai's applicability to James is problem-
atical, since the Pennsylvania statute does not require a full investi-
gation, looking to the integrity of the particular proceeding itself
and not just the integrity of the trial is a valid test and should
have been considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
However, the court recognized the trend first visible in Tehan
and explicitly stated in Johnson of weighing the "probabilities of
prejudice" in determining the retroactivity issue and decided that
the probabilities did not favor applying Coleman retroactively. The
court referred to the test of harmless error, which the United States
Supreme Court declared should be used in deciding Coleman on
remand, as a basis for distinguishing Coleman from the right to
counsel cases which were applied retroactively.' 49 The court said
that denial of counsel during trial or proceedings to determine guilt
could never be harmless error, implying that the probabilities of
error from lack of counsel at a preliminary hearing is not as great
as in these other instances. 50 This conclusion is sound when ap-
plied to certification hearings in Pennsylvania in view of the proce-
dures which greatly reduce the probability of harmful error.
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144. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
145. Mordecai v. United States, 421 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970).
146. Id. at 1136. Compare People v. Terperring, 16 Mich. App. 104, 167
N.W.2d 899 (1969) (failure to appoint counsel did not affect fact-finding
process at trial, thus holding Kent not to be retroactive); Kemplen v.
Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 8 (D. Md. 1969) (Kent not applied retroactively
since the waiver hearing is not a guilt-determining process but more like
a preliminary hearing).
147. D.C. Code § 11-1553 (Supp. iv, 1965) reads:
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an of-
fense which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or
any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult
is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after
full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for
trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have
jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult; or such other
court may exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court
in this subchapter in conducting and disposing of such cases.
148. Mordecai v. United States, 421 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 977 (1970).
149. Commonwealth v. James, 440 Pa. 205, 209-10, 269 A.2d 898, 900
(1970).
150. Id.
